摘要：The most striking difference in corporate-governance arrangements between rich
and poor countries is that the latter rely much more heavily on the dynastic
family firm, where ownership and control are passed on from one generation to
the other. We argue that if the heir to the family firm has no talent for
managerial decision making, dynastic management is a failure of meritocracy that
reduces a firm’s Total Factor Productivity. We present a simple model that
studies the macreconomic causes and consequences of dynastic management. In our
model, the incidence of dynastic management depends, among other factors, on the
imperfections of contractual enforcement. A plausible calibration suggests that,
via dynastic management, poor contract enforcement may be a substantial
contributor to observed crosscountry differences in aggregate Total Factor
Productivity.
关键词：Meritocracy, Family firms, Financial Development, TFP
