摘要：We study the impact of private ownership, incentive pay and local development
objectives on university licensing performance. We develop and test a simple
contracting model of technology licensing offices, using new survey information
together with panel data on U.S. universities for 1995-99. We find that private
universities are much more likely to adopt incentive pay than public ones, but
ownership does not affect licensing performance conditional on the use of
incentive pay. Adopting incentive pay is associated with about 30-40 percent
more income per license. Universities with strong local development objectives
generate about 30 percent less income per license, but are more likely to
license to local (in-state) startup companies. In addition, we show that
government constraints on university licensing activity are .costly. in terms of
foregone license income and the creation of start-up companies. These results
are robust to controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
关键词：incentives, performance pay, universities, technology transfer, licensing, local
development
