摘要：This paper examines the timing of exit from the gold-exchange standard for
European countries based on a panel of monthly observations 1928-1936 for two
purposes: first it aims to understand the enormous variation in monetary policy
choices across Europe. I show that the pattern of exit from gold can be
understood in terms of variation in factors commonly suggested in the
theoretical literature, which makes it possible to predict with reasonable
accuracy the very month when a country will exit gold in the 1930s. Second, I
analyse the case of Poland more closely because it appears to be an intriguing
outlier. Poland did not leave gold until April 1936 and suffered through one of
the worst examples of a depression, with massive deflation and a complete
collapse of industrial production. The estimated model fares worst for Poland,
and predicts an exit even later than April 1936. By closer inspection, the
factors that drive this prediction are the non-democratic character of the
regime and a surprisingly high degree of trade integration with France. I argue
that Poland’s monetary policy was determined by attempts of the
Piłsudski regime to defend Poland against foreign (esp. German)
aggression. I provide evidence that strongly supports this view until about
mid-1933. Ironically, just when Poland had joined the gold-bloc there were signs
of a broad strategic reorientation, which paved the way for an exit in 1936.
