摘要：A dynamic labor matching economy is presented, in which the unemployed are
either entitled to unemployment insurance (UI) or unemployment assistance (UA),
and the employees are either eligible for UI or UA upon future separations.
Eligibility for UI requires a minimum duration of contributions and UI benefits
are then paid for a limited duration. Workers are risk-averse and wages are
determined in a bilateral Nash bargain. As eligibility for UI does not
automatically follow from employment, the two types of unemployed workers have
different threat points, which delivers equilibrium wage dispersion. Most of the
variables and parameters of the model are estimated using the French sample of
the European Community Household Panel (1994-2000). We show that extending the
UI entitlement improves the situation of all groups of workers and slightly
lowers unemployment, while raising UI benefits harms the unemployed on
assistance and raises unemployment. Easier eligibility fo r UI also improves the
situation of all groups of workers and favors relatively more the least well-off
than longer entitlement. The re-entitlement effect in France lowers by 10% the
rise in the wage and by 13% the rise in unemployment following a 10% increase in
benefit levels.
