摘要：Collective bargaining in Germany takes place either at the industry level or at
the firm level; collective bargaining coverage is much higher than union
density; and not all employees in a covered firm are necessarily covered. This
institutional setup suggests to distinguish explicitly union power as measured
by net union density (NUD) in a labor market segment, coverage at the firm
level, and coverage at the individual level. Using linked employer-employee data
and applying quantile regressions, this is the first empirical paper which
simultaneously analyzes these three dimensions of union influence on the
structure of wages. Ceteris paribus, a higher share of employees in a firm
covered by industry-wide or firm-level contracts is associated with higher
wages. Yet, individual bargaining coverage in a covered firm shows a negative
impact both on the wage level and on wage dispersion. A higher union density
reinforces the effects of coverage, but the effect of union density is negative
at all points in the wage distribution for uncovered employees. In line with an
insurance motive, higher union density compresses the wage structure and, at the
same time, it is associated with a uniform leftward movement of the distribution
for uncovered employees.
