摘要：It has often been claimed that firms’ compliance to environmental regulations is higher than predicted
by standard theory, a result labeled the “Harrington paradox” in the literature. Enforcement data
from Norway presented here appears, at first glance, to confirm this “stylized fact”: Firms are
inspected less than once a year, detected violators are seldom fined, but still, serious violations seem
relatively rare. However, at a closer look, the paradox dissolves: Enforcement of minor violations is
lax, but such violations do flourish; serious violations are more uncommon, but such violations are
subject to credible threats of harsh punishment. This seems quite consistent with predictions from
standard theory. Although our finding may of course apply to Norway only, we argue that the
empirical existence of the Harrington paradox is not well documented in the literature. Hence, the
claim that firms’ compliance with environmental regulations is higher than predicted by standard
theory should be viewed with skepticism.
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