期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens in
Resource and Energy Economics 2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers the
respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public
goods model as customarily applied to the climate change problem. After a reminder of the
model structure and of the definition of the two game theoretical stability notions involved ¨C
namely, core stability and internal-external stability, the former property is shown to hold for
the grand coalition in the CWS model only if resource transfers of a specific form between
countries are introduced. It is further shown that while the latter property holds neither for the
grand coalition nor for most large coalitions, it is nevertheless verified in a weak sense that
involves transfers (dubbed "potential internal stability") for most small coalitions. The reason
for this difference is brought to light, namely the differing rationale that inspires the transfers
in either case. Finally, it is shown that the stable coalitions that perform best (in terms of
carbon concentration and global welfare) always are composed of both industrialized and
developing countries. Two sensitivity analyses confirm the robustness of all these results.
