期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：We analyse a (differentiated good) industry where an incumbent firm owns a network
good (essential input) and faces potential competition in the (downstream) retail
market. Unlike the traditional approach, we consider a scenario where the decision to
compete or not in the downstream segment is endogenous, and this decision depends
on the particular mechanism designed by the utilitarian regulator. We assume that the
technology of the potential entrant is private information. We derive the efficient
(Ramsey) prices and access charge taking the impact of a non-discriminatory
mechanism on entry decision into account. We assert that the optimal pricing formula
must include a Ramsey term that is inversely related to the "modified" superelasticity
of the retail good under consideration. We further show, under unknown cost, that
there might be "excess" or "too little" entry compared to the socially optimal level.
