期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：We analyse a model of two-sided matching and incentive contracts where expert
investors (venture capitalists) with different monitoring capacities are matched with
firms with different levels of initial wealth. Firms do not have sufficient start-up
capital to cover their project costs and hence, seek external financing. In equilibrium,
the matching and the payoffs of the venture capitalists and the firms are determined
simultaneously. More effective VCs and higher-wealth firms consume higher payoffs.
We also show that, in equilibrium VCs with higher monitoring ability invest in firms
with lower initial wealth following a negatively assortative matching pattern.
