期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：International markets for tradable emission permits (TEP) co-exist with national
energy taxation. A firm trading emission permits in the international market also pays
energy taxes in its host country, thus creating an interaction between the international
TEP-market and national energy taxes. In this paper we model that interaction in a
framework of a perfectly competitive international TEP-market, where heterogeneous
firms trade their TEP endowments. National governments set energy taxes noncooperatively
so as to maximize fiscal revenue from energy and profit taxes. We
identify the driving forces behind Nash equilibrium taxes. We show how they depend
on the total amount of TEPs in the market, on firms' TEP-endowment and on the
number of participating countries. We also show how energy taxation varies with the
introduction of the market on a previously unregulated world. Finally, we highlight
the fact that the TEP-market does not achieve abatement cost efficiency, despite its
being perfectly competitive.
