期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：This paper presents a market design for the management of noise disturbance created by
aircraft traffic around large airports. A market for tradable noise permits allows noise
generators to compensate harmed residents. We show that the noise permit markets allow
the achievement of the planner's optimal allocation of flights provided that she/he does not
over-weight the benefit of economic activity compared to the disutility of noise
disturbances. The fact that zones are likely to be strategic players does not fundamentally
alter this finding. Because of the market auctioneer's information constraints, noise permits
are likely to redistribute windfall gains to residents located in non-critical zones. This
entices landlords to increase their land/house rents there and to design smaller houses in the
long run.
