期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：In this paper, we address the incentives to invest in environmental innovation of enterprises
that exercise market power in the output market and also buy and sell pollution permits.
Differently from the existing literature, using a market approach we explicitly model the
interaction between the output market, where firms play ¨¤ la Cournot, and the permits
market. We find that, in the new equilibrium firms behave symmetrically, that is, they either
both innovate to protect their market share in the output market or they both choose not to
innovate. Whether the innovation equilibrium arises or not depends on the output demand
and on the productivity enhancement and not on the distribution of permits among firms.
Finally, we show that, under this market configuration, collusion can be welfare enhancing.
关键词：environmental innovation, tradable permits, interaction ¨¤ la Cournot.
