期刊名称:CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度:2007
卷号:1
出版社:Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要:We consider multiple-type housing markets. To capture the dynamic aspect of trade in such
markets, we study a dynamic recontracting process similar to the one introduced by Serrano and
Volij (2005). First, we analyze the set of recurrent classes of this process as a (non-empty)
solution concept. We show that each core allocation always constitutes a singleton recurrent
class and provide examples of non-singleton recurrent classes consisting of blocking-cycles of
individually rational allocations. For multiple-type housing markets stochastic stability never
serves as a selection device among recurrent classes.
Next, we propose a method to compute the limit invariant distribution of the dynamic
recontracting process. The limit invariant distribution exploits the interplay of coalitional
stability and accessibility that determines a probability distribution over final allocations. We
provide various examples to demonstrate how the limit invariant distribution discriminates
among stochastically stable allocations: surprisingly, some core allocations are less likely to be
final allocations of the dynamic process than cycles composed of non-core allocations.