期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presence
of private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from
such agreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation
is a necessary feature of any efficient equilibrium.
We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to
international transfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities.
Within the current world trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed
whereas export subsidies are prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a
retaliatory fashion might be optimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatoy use of
antidumping observed in the last decades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to
other trade remedies.
