期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：We analyse firms' incentives to provide two-way compatibility between two network goods
with different intrinsic qualities. We study how the relative importance of vertical
differentiation with respect to the network effect influences the price competition as well as the
compatibility choice. The final degree of compatibility allows firms to manipulate the overall
differentiation. Under weak network effect, full compatibility may arise: the low quality firm
has higher incentives to offer it in order to prevent the rival from dominating the market.
Under strong network effect we observe multiple equilibria for consumers' demands. However,
in any equilibrium of the full game, coordination takes place on the high quality good which,
we assume, always maintains its overall quality dominance.
