期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：We study mechanisms to construct equal-opportunity policies for resource allocation. In our
model agents enjoy welfare as a function of the effort they expend, and the amount of a
socially provided resource they consume. Nevertheless, agents have interdependent
preferences, i.e., they not only care about their own allocation, but also about their peers'
allocations. As in the standard approach to equality of opportunity, the aim is to allocate the
social resource so that welfare across individuals at the same relative effort level is as equal as
possible. We show how pursuing this same aim while assuming that agents have
interdependent preferences might crucially alter the results.
关键词：equality of opportunity, interdependent preferences, social policies, compensation,
responsibility.
