期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which
matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We
provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings
is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its
element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically)
stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not
corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching
problems with responsive preferences.
关键词：matching problem, von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, farsighted stability
