期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of privatization in a mixed duopoly, where
a private firm competes in quantities with a welfare-maximizing public firm. We consider two
inefficiencies of the public sector: a possible cost inefficiency, and an allocative inefficiency
due to the distortionary effect of taxation (shadow cost of public funds). Furthermore, we
analyze the effect of privatization on the timing of competition by endogenizing the
determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using
the model developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The latter is especially relevant for the
analysis of privatization, given that results and policy prescription emerged in the literature
crucially rely on the type of competition assumed. We show that privatization has generally
the effect of shifting from Stackelberg to Cournot equilibrium and that, absent efficiency gains
privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are realized,
an inefficient public firm may be preferred.
