期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：This paper studies the normative problem of redistribution among individuals who can
influence their longevity through a non-monetary effort but have different taste for effort. As
benchmarks, we first present the laissez-faire and the first best. In the first best, the level of
effort is always lower than in the laissez-faire as the social planner takes into account the
consequences of higher survival on the budget constraint. However, since we suppose that
effort is private and non-monetary (like exercising), it is reasonable to think that the social
planner has no control over it. Thus, we modify our framework and assume for the rest of the
paper that effort is determined by the individual while the social planner only allocates
consumptions. Under full information with non monitored effort, early consumption is
preferred to future consumption and the high-survival individual obtains higher future
consumption. Under asymmetric information, the distortion is identical for the low-survival
individual while the direction of the distortion for the high-survival individual is ambiguous.
We finally show how to decentralize these allocations through a perfect annuity market and
(positive or negative) taxes on annuities.
关键词：annuities, effort, differential mortality, non linear taxation.
