期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：We consider a two-period model. In the first period, individuals consume two goods: one
is sinful and the other is not. The sin good brings pleasure but has a detrimental effect on
second period health and individuals tend to underestimate this effect. In the second
period, individuals can devote part of their saving to improve their health status and thus
compensate for the damage caused by their sinful consumption. We consider two
alternative specifications concerning this second period health care decision: either
individuals acknowledge that they have made a mistake in the first period out of myopia
or ignorance, or they persist in ignoring the detrimental effect of their sinful consumption.
We study the optimal linear taxes on sin good consumption, saving and health care
expenditures for a paternalistic social planner. We compare those taxes in the two
specifications. We show under which circumstances the first best outcome can be
decentralized and we study the second best taxes when saving is unobservable.
关键词：paternalism, behavioral, economics, dual self v single self.
