期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：The present note first provides an alternative formulation of the Cancian, Bills and Bergstr.m (1995)-
problem which discards the non-existence difficulty and consequently allows to consider some extensions
of the TV-newscast scheduling game. The extension we consider consists in assuming that
viewers'preferences between the competing channels do not depend only on the timing of their broadcast,
but also on some other characteristics, like the content of the show or the identity of the newscaster. Then
we identify a sufficient condition on the dispersion of these preferences over the viewers'population
guaranteeing the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. It turns out that, at this equilibrium, both networks
broadcast their news at the same instant.
