期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：This paper studies the optimal linear tax-transfer policy in an economy where agents differ in
productivity and in genetic background, and where longevity depends on health spending and
genes. It is shown that, if agents internalize imperfectly the impact of genes and health
spending on longevity, the utilitarian social optimum can be decentralized with type-specific
redistributive lump sum transfers and Pigouvian taxes correcting for agents's myopia (leading
to undersaving and underinvestment in health), and for their incapacity to perceive the effect
of health spending on the resource constraint of the economy (causing overinvestment in
health). The second-best problem is also examined under linear taxation instruments. Our
main result is that it may be optimal to tax health spending, in particular under a
complementarity of genes and health spending in the production of longevity.
关键词：longevity, myopia, genetic background, social security, paternalism
