期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：In this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an
international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to
explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate agreements. We
compare a minus 20 percent unilateral commitment strategy by the EU with a unilateral minus 30
percent emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment
climate-economy simulation model, we find that carbon leakage effects are negligible. The EU strategy
to reduce emissions by 30% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020 if other Annex-B countries follow does
not induce participation of the USA with a similar 30% reduction commitment. However, the model
shows that an appropriate initial allocation of emission allowances may stabilize a larger and more
ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.
