期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：In the French urban public transport industry, services are often delegated to a private firm
by the mean of a fixed-term regulatory contract. This contract specifies the duties of the
firm and a financial compensation. When it expires, a new contract is awarded, possibly to
a different operator. Cost-plus and fixed-price (gross cost or net cost) contracts are
commonly used to regulate the operators in the transport industry. In this paper, we
analyse the incentives for the operator to reduce its cost. These incentives come from both
the profit maximization during the current contract and the perspective of contract renewal.
In our model, the amount of cost-reducing effort depends on the contract type and the time
remaining till contract expiration. We use a sample of 124 French urban public transport
networks covering the period 1995-2002 to test our predictions. Our proxy for the cost
reducing effort is technical efficiency. The data largely confirm the importance of contract
type on performances and the incentive effect of contract renewal.
