期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：We study a trade-off between economic and environmental indicators using a twostage
optimal control setting where the player can switch to a cleaner technology,
that is environmentally ¡°efficient¡±, but economically less productive. We provide an
analytical characterization of the solution paths for the case where the considered
utility functions are increasing and strictly concave with respect to consumption
and decreasing linearly with respect to the pollution stock. In this context, an
isolated player will either immediately start using the environmentally efficient
technology, or for ever continue applying the old and ¡°dirty¡± technology. In a twoplayer
(say, two neighbor countries) dynamic game where the pollution results
from a sum of two consumptions, we prove existence of a Nash (open-loop)
equilibrium, in which each player chooses the technology selfishly i.e., without
considering the choice made by the other player. A Stackelberg game solution
displays the same properties. Under cooperation, the country reluctant to adopt the
technology as an equilibrium solution, chooses to switch to the cleaner technology
provided it benefits from some ¡°transfer¡± from the environmentally efficient
partner.
