期刊名称：COWLES Foundation Discussion Paper / Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：Yale University
摘要：We define and examine the performance of three minimal strategic games in laboratory relative to their theoretical predictions. These closed exchange economies have limited amounts of cash to facilitate transactions, and include feedback unlike open or partial equilibrium settings of most experiments. Without a role for money or credit, and abstracting away from market mechanisms, general equilibrium theory makes no predictions about how paths of convergence to the CE may differ across alternative markets. Our laboratory data reveal different paths of convergence to CE, and different levels of allocative efficiency in the three settings. The results suggest that abstraction from institutional details may have been taken too far, and, for example, the oligopoly effect of feedback from buying an endowed good is missed. Inclusion of mechanism differences into theory may help us understand markets better.
关键词：Strategic market games, Laboratory experiments, General equilibrium
