期刊名称：DEEP Cahiers de Recherches Économiques / Université de Lausanne
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：Université de Lausanne
摘要：We conduct a laboratory experiment to test the empirical behavior of the bid-and-propose mechanism, defined in Navarro and Perea (2005). This mechanism implements the Myerson value for networks, and therefore its outcome posesses fairness properties. Since the bid-and-propose mechanism includes an ultimatum game in the last stage, we design an experiment with several treatments, where subjects also play the simple ultimatum game. In order to check whether subjectsbehave fairly in the sense of Myerson or they are inequity averse, we compare resultsfrom games with symmetric and asymmetric outside options.
关键词：experiments; fairness; Myerson value; ultimatum game
