期刊名称：DEEP Cahiers de Recherches Économiques / Université de Lausanne
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：Université de Lausanne
摘要：This paper explores the implications of fairness and reciprocity in dynamic market games. A reciprocal player responds to kind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The paper shows that for general perceptions of fairness, reciprocity facilitates collusion in dynamic market games. The paper also shows that this is a robust result. It holds when players' choices are strategic complements and strategic substitutes. It also holds under grim trigger punishments and optimal punishments.
关键词：fairness; reciprocity; collusion; repeated games
