期刊名称：Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要：Many negotiations (for instance, among political parties, partners
in a business) are characterised by dynamic accumulation:
current agreements affect future bargaining possibilities. We study
such situations by using repeated bargaining games in which two
parties can decide how much to invest and how to share the residual
surplus for their own consumption. We show that there is a
unique (stationary) Markov Perfect Equilibrium characterised by
immediate agreement. Moreover, in equilibrium a relatively more
patient party invests more than his opponent. However, being
more patient can make a player worse off. In addition, we derive
the conditions under which we obtain the efficient investment
path. Our results are robust to different bargaining procedures,
different rates of time preferences and elasticities of substitution.
