期刊名称：Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要：We construct a general equilibrium model of economic growth and optimally chosen fiscal
policy, in which individuals compete with each other for a share of government spending and two
political parties alternate in power according to electoral uncertainty. The main prediction is that
uncertainty about remaining in power results in increased fiscal spending, which in turn distorts
incentives by pushing individuals away from productive work to rent-seeking activities; then,
distorted incentives hurt growth. This scenario receives empirical support in a dataset of 25 OECD
countries over the period 1982-1996. In particular, uncertainty about remaining in power leads to
larger government shares in GDP, which in turn exert an adverse effect on the ICRG index measuring
incentives and this is bad for growth.
