期刊名称：Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要：We incorporate an uncoordinated redistributive struggle for extra fiscal privileges into an otherwise standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The main aim is to get model-consistent quantitative evidence of the extent of rent seeking. Our work is motivated by the common belief that interest groups compete with each other for privileged transfers, subsidies and tax treatments at the expense of the general public interest. The model is calibrated to the euro area as a whole, and to individual euro member-countries, over the period 1980-2003. We find that an important proportion of tax revenue is appropriated by rent seekers and that the introduction of rent seeking moves the model in the right direction vis-à-vis the data.
关键词：Fiscal policy, real business cycles, rent seeking.
