期刊名称：Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要：We study a trade-off between economic and environmental indicators using a two-stage optimal control
setting where the player can switch to a cleaner technology, that is environmentally “efficient”, but
economically less productive. We provide an analytical characterization of the solution paths for
the case where the considered utility functions are increasing and strictly concave with respect to
consumption and decreasing linearly with respect to the pollution stock. In this context, an isolated
player will either immediately start using the environmentally efficient technology, or for ever continue
applying the old and “dirty” technology. In a two-player (say, two neighbor countries) dynamic game
where the pollution results from a sum of two consumptions, we prove existence of a Nash (openloop)
equilibrium, in which each player chooses the technology selfishly i.e., without considering the
choice made by the other player. A Stackelberg game solution displays the same properties. Under
cooperation, the country reluctant to adopt the technology as an equilibrium solution, chooses to
switch to the cleaner technology provided it benefits from some “transfer” from the environmentally
efficient partner.
关键词：Pollution, technology adoption, optimal control, dynamic games
