期刊名称：Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要：This paper investigates the importance of political ideology and opportunism in the
choice of the tax structure. In particular, we examine the effects of cabinet ideology and elections
on the distribution of the tax burden across factors of production and consumption for 21 OECD
countries over the period 1970-2000 by employing four alternative cabinet ideology measures and
by using the methodology of effective tax rates. There is evidence of both opportunistic and
partisan effects on tax policies. More precisely, we find that left-wing governments rely more on
capital relative to labor income taxation and that they tend to increase consumption taxes.
Moreover, we find that income tax rates (but not consumption taxes) tend to be reduced in preelectoral
periods and that capital effective tax rates (defined broadly to include taxes on selfemployed
income) are reduced by more than effective labor tax rates.
关键词：tax structure; political economy; partisan and opportunistic effects
