期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, Monash University
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：Monash University
摘要：This paper will analyse the operation of the British common law of riparian rights in the Riverina
District of New South Wales (NSW), Australia between 1850 and 1870.* Theorists argue that the
predisposition of people to fight over or cooperate to exploit valuable resources depends on how
well property rights are defined and enforced.. The operation of the riparian doctrine in the
Riverina provides an empirical, historical example of why inefficient property rights promote
violence. Violence in this instance was based on collective action directed at the destruction of
water supply infrastructure, specifically dams, constructed on various rivers within the Riverina.
This paper considers why collective action in violence did not spill over into infrastructure
construction. It is argued that the failure of collective action was due to its high costs stemming
from several factors: failure to meet optimal group size; problems of free riders; hold-up concerns;
and the introduction of a much disputed land policy in 1861 referred to as selection.
