期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, Monash University
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Monash University
摘要：This paper studies internal organization of a firm using an incomplete
contracting approach `a la Grossman-Hart-Moore and Aghion-Tirole.
The two key ingredients of our model are externalities among tasks
that require coordination, and investment in task-specific human capital.
We compare three types of organizational structures: centralization
where the decision authority for all tasks is given to the party
without task-specific human capital, decentralization where the decision
authority for each task is given to the party with necessary human
capital, and hierarchical delegation where the decision authority
is allocated in a hierarchical fashion. Centralization is optimal when
externalities and the requisite coordination are the main issue in organization
design. Decentralization is optimal if the investment in human
capital is more important. Hierarchical delegation is optimal in the intermediate
case. We also discuss the optimal pattern of hierarchical
delegation as well as several directions extending the basic model.
