期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, Monash University
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Monash University
摘要：A static income tax evasion model ¨¤ la Yitzhaki (1974) predicts that an increase
in the tax rate causes taxpayers to increase their income declaration. In an important
contribution, Lin and Yang (2001) obtained exactly the opposite result by extending
the Yitzhaki (1974) model to a dynamic one with Ak(t) production technology. In this
paper we show that once the Lin and Yang (2001) model becomes fully compatible
with the Yitzhaki¡¯s (1974) setting, the negative relationship between taxes and
evasion still prevails. We then enrich the dynamic model with a productive public sector, and
obtain an ambiguous relationship between taxes and evasion incentives as in
Allingham and Sandmo (1972). We also prove that the growth-maximizing share of public
expenditures in total output satisfies the natural efficiency condition even in the
presence of tax evasion. However, the latter result is not robust to the introduction of the
costs associated with income declaration and concealment activities.
