期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：This paper examines breakup fees and stock lockups as devices for prospective target
firms to encourage bidder participation in takeover contest. We show that, unless bidding
costs for the first bidder are too high, breakup fees provide for the socially desirable degree
of competition and ensure the efficient allocation of the target to the highest valued buyer
in a takeover auction. In contrast, stock lockups permit the target firm to subsidize entry
of a new bidder at the expense of an incumbent bidder. Stock lockups induce too much
competition when offered to a second bidder and too little competition when offered to a
first bidder. Despite their socially wasteful properties, target management would favor stock
lockups as they induce takeover competition at least cost to the target.
关键词：Takeover bidding, Breakup Fees, and Stock Lockups.
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