期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：This paper studies optimal taxation of entrepreneurial capital with private information and multiple
assets. Entrepreneurial activity is subject to a dynamic moral hazard problem and entrepreneurs face
idiosyncratic capital risk. We first characterize the optimal allocation subject to the incentive compatibility
constraints resulting from the private information. The optimal tax system implements such an allocation
as a competitive equilibrium for a given market structure. We consider several market structures that
differ in the assets or contracts traded and obtain three novel results. First, differential asset taxation
is optimal. Marginal taxes on bonds depend on the correlation of their returns with idiosyncratic capital
risk, which determines their hedging value. Entrepreneurial capital always receives a subsidy relative
to other assets in the bad states. Second, if entrepreneurs are allowed to sell equity, the optimal tax
system embeds a prescription for double taxation of capital income a.. at the firm level and at the
investor level. Finally, we show that taxation of assets is essential even with competitive insurance
contracts, when entrepreneurial portfolios are also unobserved.
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