期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：We study countries choosing armament levels and then whether or not to
go to war. We show that if the costs of war are not overly high or low, then
all equilibria must involve .dove,..hawk,.and .deterrent.strategies and the
probability of war is positive (but less than one) in any given period. Wars
are between countries with di¡èering armament levels and the frequency of wars
is tempered by the presence of armament levels that are expressly chosen for
their deterrent properties. As the probability of winning a war becomes more
reactive to increased armament, the frequency of wars decreases. Finally, as it
becomes increasingly possible to negotiate a credible settlement, the probabil-
ity of peace increases, but the variance of armament levels increases and war
becomes increasingly likely when negotiation is not available. This matches
observed patterns in the data over time.
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