期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：We study a model where a decision maker (DM) must select an adviser to advise
her about an unknown state of the world. There is a pool of available advisers who
all have the same underlying preferences as the DM; they differ, however, in their
prior beliefs about the state, which we interpret as differences of opinion. We derive
a tradeoff faced by the DM: an adviser with a greater difference of opinion has greater
incentives to acquire information, but reveals less of any information she acquires,
via strategic disclosure. Nevertheless, it is optimal to choose an adviser with at least
some difference of opinion. The analysis reveals two novel incentives for an agent
to acquire information: a ¡°persuasion¡± motive and a motive to ¡°avoid prejudice.¡±
Delegation is costly for the DM because it eliminates both of these incentives. We
also study the relationship between difference of opinion and difference of preference.
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