期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：We use administrative longitudinal data on earnings, impairment, and mortality to replicate
and extend Bound¡¯s seminal study of rejected applicants to federal Disability Insurance (DI). We
confirm Bound¡¯s main result that rejected older male applicants do not exhibit substantial labor
force participation. We show this result is stable over time, robust to more narrow control groups,
and similar within gender, impairment, industry, and earnings groups. However, we also find that
younger rejected applicants have substantial employment after application. To what extent this
translates into potential employment for new beneficiaries depends on which group among them is
considered ¡°on the margin¡± of receiving DI. If we use initially rejected applicants ¨C a large and
growing fraction of new beneficiaries ¨C the resulting counterfactual employment rate for younger
applicants is low, too. We also find that rejected applicants bear signs of economically induced
applicants. DI appears to induce a growing number of less successful workers to apply, an important
fraction of which ends up without benefits and non-employed.
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