期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common
method for assigning objects to individuals. The mechanism is easy to implement and
strategy-proof. However this mechanism is inecient, as the agents may be made all
better o
by another mechanism that increases their chances of obtaining more preferred
objects. Such an ineciency is eliminated by the recent mechanism called probabilistic
serial, but this mechanism is not strategy-proof. Thus, which mechanism to employ in
practical applications has been an open question. This paper shows that these mechanisms
become equivalent when the market becomes large. More speci cally, given a set
of object types, the random assignments in these mechanisms converge to each other as
the number of copies of each object type approaches in nity. Thus, the ineciency of
the random priority mechanism becomes small in large markets. Our result gives some
rationale for the common use of the random priority mechanism in practical problems
such as student placement in public schools. JEL Classi cation Numbers: C70, D61,
D63.
关键词：random assignment, random priority, probabilistic serial, ordinal eciency,
asymptotic equivalence.
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