期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum
in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance
mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate
their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante ineciency when ties
at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred
acceptance mechanism which allows students to inuence how they are treated
in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a
greater scope of eciency.
关键词：Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm, choice-augmented
deferred acceptance, tie breaking, ex ante Pareto eciency.
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