摘要：Bresnahan and Lau developed a model of profit maximising oligopoly banks in order to
determine the degree of market power of the average bank. The equilibrium price equation
includes a mark up, which is not used at all under perfect competition, partly used under
oligopoly or monopolistic competition and fully used under monopoly. The data requirements of
the model allow testing of possible use of market power for submarkets. This article investigates
the degree of competition on both the deposit and loan markets in nine EU countries, both apart
and jointly. The hypothesis of perfect competition can be rejected for the deposit market of the
¡®entire¡¯ EU, for the deposit markets of Germany and Spain and for the lending markets of
Germany, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Nevertheless, these markets are characterised as
highly competitive, because the use or abuse of market power is very limited.
