摘要：We study optimal nominal demand policy in a flexible price economy
with monopolistic competition where firms have imperfect common knowledge
about the shocks hitting the economy. Information imperfections
emerge endogenously because firms are assumed to have finite (Shannon)
capacity to process information. We then ask how policy that minimizes
a quadratic objective in output and prices depends on firms¡¯ processing
capacity. When price setting decisions of firms are strategic complements,
we find that policy should nominally accommodate white noise mark-up
shocks for a large range of capacity values. This finding is robust to the
policy maker observing shocks imperfectly or being uncertain about firms¡¯
processing capacity. When mark-up shocks are persistent, accommodation
may even have to increase in the medium term but has to decrease in
the long-run, thereby generating a hump-shaped price response and a slow
reduction in output. Instead, when prices are strategic substitutes, policy
tends to react with nominal demand contractions to mark-up shocks.
In addition, there might exist discontinuities between common knowledge
equilibria and equilibria with small amounts of imperfect common knowledge.
关键词：optimal policy, information frictions, imperfect common
knowledge, higher order beliefs, Shannon capacity
