摘要：Some central banks have a reputation for being secretive. A justification for that
behavior that we find in the literature is that being transparent about its operations and
beliefs hinders the central bank in achieving the best outcome. In other words, a
central bank needs flexibility and therefore cannot be fully transparent. Using a
forward-looking New-Keynesian model, we find exactly the opposite. A central bank
that is conservative improves output stabilization by being transparent about the
procedures it uses to assess the economy and, especially, about the forecast errors it
makes. Under certain conditions transparency by a conservative central bank also
improves interest rate stabilization. We also find that higher transparency makes it
optimal for the central bank to be more conservative as the benefits from higher
transparency in terms of output stabilization are greater the more conservative the
central bank is.
关键词：monetary policy, central bank, information processing, expectation
formation
