期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, University of Essex
出版年度：2004
卷号：2004
出版社：University of Essex
摘要：The objective of this paper is to study equilibrium in a labour market with
search frictions a la Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Identical firms post
wage-contracts and ex-ante identical workers search for a job while unemployed
and for a better one while employed. Although this situation has been analysed
before, Stevens (2004) and Burdett and Coles (2003), the main novelty of this
paper is to allow firms to offer contracts according to the worker's initial
experience and employment status. We construct an equilibrium in which firms
compete in "promotion" contracts and offer unemployed workers longer "probation"
periods than to employed workers. An interesting feature of this equilibrium is
that outside offers become more generous with experience. This generates workers
cohort effects within a firm that depend on the level of experience at which
they where hired. The distribution of earnings within the firm is then such that
workers who have acquired more "outside" firm experience and more tenure are
higher in the earnings scale.
