期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, University of Essex
出版年度：2005
卷号：2005
出版社：University of Essex
摘要：This paper addresses the following question: Does competition enhance efficiency
in markets with quality uncertainty? Using the mechanism design methodology, we
characterize the maximal achievable level of efficiency in such markets, and
then use this characterization to analyze how maximal efficiency varies with the
degree of market competition. We show that the relationship between them is in
general a non-trivial function of the main market parameters. In particular we
show: (i) for some set of parameter values maximal efficiency is strictly
increasing in the degree of market competition (although it never attains the
first-best), but only until competition is sufficiently intense; thereafter,
maximal efficiency is strictly decreasing in the degree of competition; (ii) for
some set of parameter values maximal efficiency is strictly decreasing in the
degree of market competition, attaining the first-best when there is no
competition; and (iii) for some set of parameter values maximal efficiency is
strictly increasing in the degree of market competition, attains the first-best
once competition is sufficiently intense, and then remains at the first-best
thereafter.
