期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, University of Essex
出版年度：2005
卷号：2005
出版社：University of Essex
摘要：Banks can fail because of bad economic fundamentals, and/or general panic
withdrawals by depositors who feel the bank does not have sufficient reserves to
meet the demand. This paper attempts to find the optimal reserve level and early
returns the banks should decide on. If the reserve policy of the bank is
transparent, it is found that more reserves have to be put aside over and above
the real need, and this inefficiency increases with the proportion of impatient
agents. It is also found that the optimal early return is lower than the
first-best. The model recommends that when reserve policy is transparent there
is no need for regulation. However, if reserve policy is not transparent, the
model recommends regulation for both reserves and early returns. This is because
of the moral hazard problem, the banks would keep lower reserves and offer
higher early returns than what maximises depositor welfare.
