期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, University of Essex
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
出版社：University of Essex
摘要：We analyze a large-stakes prisoner's dilemma game played on a TV show. Players
cooperate 40% of the time, demonstrating that social preferences are important;
however, cooperation is significantly below the 50% threshold that is required
for inequity aversion to sustain cooperation. Women cooperate significantly more
than men, while players who have "earned" more of the stake cooperate less. A
player's promise to cooperate is also a good predictor of his decision.
Surprisingly, a player's probability of cooperation is unrelated to the
opponent's characteristics or promise. We argue that inequity aversion alone
cannot adequately explain these results; reputational concerns in a public
setting might be more important.
